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HAILES V. STATE: THE STATE MAY APPEAL A TRIAL 
COURT’S RULING EXCLUDING A DYING DECLARATION; 
THE LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN A DECLARANT’S 
STATEMENT AND DEATH IS IRRELEVANT IN A DYING 
DECLARATION ANALYSIS; THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE IS INAPPLICABLE TO DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
By: Lauren A. Panfile 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the State may appeal a trial 
court’s suppression of a victim’s dying declaration based on the legislative 
intent of Section 12-302(c)(4)(i) of the Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial 
Procedure Article (“section 12-302(c)(4)(i)”).  Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 
497-98, 113 A.3d 608, 613-14 (2015).  The court further held that a victim’s 
statement, made while on life support, was a dying declaration regardless of 
the fact that the victim died two years after making the statement.  Id. at 506, 
113 A.3d at 618.  Finally, the court held that the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to dying 
declarations.  Id. at 513, 113 A.3d at 622. 
     On November 22, 2010, Melvin Pate (“Pate”) became a quadriplegic and 
lost his ability to speak after being shot in the side of his face.  On November 
24, 2010, Pate was transferred to the Shock Trauma Center at the University 
of Maryland Medical Center, where doctors informed Pate that he only had 
twenty-four hours to live.  When Pate heard this, his eyes welled up with tears. 
     On November 26, 2010, detectives showed Pate a photographic array of 
possible perpetrators of the shooting, which included a photo of Jermaine 
Hailes (“Hailes”).  The detectives asked Pate to blink hard if he recognized the 
person who shot him.  Using this method, Pate identified Hailes as his shooter. 
     At the time he identified Hailes, Pate was confined to a hospital bed on life 
support, a ventilator, and feeding tubes.  Despite being told by his doctor that 
he wouldn’t make it, Pate was released from the hospital in 2011.  Pate died 
in November 2012 of complications resulting from the gunshot wound. 
     Hailes was charged in the Circuit Court of Prince George’s County with 
first-degree murder and other related crimes.  He subsequently filed a motion 
to suppress Pate’s pretrial identification, arguing that the identification 
violated the Confrontation Clause because Pate could not be cross-examined.  
The circuit court granted the motion, determining that the identification was a 
dying declaration, but was inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.  The 
State appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
judgment and remanded for trial.  Hailes petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted. 
     The court of appeals began its analysis by addressing Hailes’ interpretation 
of section 12-302(c)(4)(i) regarding the State’s ability to appeal a trial court’s 
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judgment.  Hailes, 442 Md. at 494-95, 113 A.3d at 611-12.  First, Hailes 
argued that the statute’s use of the word “seized” only allowed the State to 
appeal a trial court’s exclusion of tangible evidence.  Id. at 494-95, 113 A.3d 
at 612.  Because Pate’s statement could not be physically seized, Hailes 
asserted that this made the statement intangible evidence.  Id. at 495, 113 A.3d 
at 612. 
     Second, Hailes contended that the statutory language “to have been seized 
in violation of the Constitution. . .” only allowed the State to appeal if the trial 
court excluded evidence because it was obtained in violation of a 
constitutional right, not because evidence was admitted in violation of a 
constitutional right.  Hailes, 442 Md. at 495, 113 A.3d at 612.  Hailes claimed 
that the detectives did not violate any constitutional rights when they obtained 
Pate’s statement, and therefore the State could not appeal.  Id.            
     The court of appeals was not persuaded by either of Hailes’ arguments, and 
deemed the wording of the statute ambiguous. Hailes, 442 Md. at 496-98, 113 
A.3d at 612-13.  Relying on legislative intent, the court cited language in the 
legislative history of Senate Bills 39 and 196, which states that the statute 
applies in cases where the judge excluded “any evidence which is at the heart 
of the State’s case” and applies to evidence including “identifications of the 
defendant.”  Id. at 496-97, 113 A.3d at 613 (internal citations omitted).  
Therefore, the statute applies to both tangible and intangible evidence.  Id. at 
497, 113 A.3d at 613.  
     The court of appeals also determined that the statute broadly applies to any 
type of constitutional violation that a trial court uses to exclude evidence.  
Hailes, 442 Md. at 497, 113 A.3d at 613.  The court found that it makes no 
difference whether the constitutional violation occurs in the seizure or the 
admission of the evidence.  Id. at 497-98, 113 A.3d at 613.  If the trial court 
excludes the evidence on constitutional grounds, the State may appeal.  Id. at 
497-98, 113 A.3d at 613-14.  In this case, the court of appeals held that the 
State could appeal the trial court’s exclusion of Pate’s identification.  Id.  
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland next considered whether the trial court 
was correct in determining that Pate’s identification of Hailes was a dying 
declaration.  Hailes, 442 Md. at 498, 113 A.3d at 614.  Specifically, the court 
addressed whether the trial court erred in finding that Pate believed his death 
was imminent.  Id.  The court noted that a dying declaration is a recognized 
exception to the rule against hearsay, and is defined as “a statement made by 
[the] declarant, while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, 
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be his 
or her impending death.”  Id. at 500, 113 A.3d at 615 (quoting MD Rule § 5-
804(b)(2)).   
     The court of appeals highlighted Pate’s condition, the doctor’s statement to 
Pate that he only had twenty-four hours to live, and Pate’s welled up eyes in 
response to his prognosis, as sufficient evidence to infer that Pate genuinely 
believed his death was imminent.  Hailes, 442 Md. at 501-02, 113 A.3d at 615-
16.  The court also emphasized that the length of time between a declarant’s 
statement and the declarant’s actual death is given very little, if any, weight in 
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the court’s analysis.  Id. at 505-06, 113 A.3d at 618.  The court need only 
decide whether the declarant’s belief was “genuine, not whether it was, in 
hindsight, accurate.”  Id. at 504, 113 A.3d at 617 (citing Worthington v. State, 
92 Md. 222, 242, 48 A. 355, 358 (1901)).  Therefore, the court of appeals held 
that the trial court correctly determined that Pate’s statement was a dying 
declaration.  Hailes, 442 Md. at 506, 113 A.3d at 618. 
     Lastly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed whether the 
Confrontation Clause applies to dying declarations.  Hailes, 442 Md. at 506, 
113 A.3d at 618.  To make its decision, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s 
consistent precedent that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to dying 
declarations. Id. at 507-09, 113 A.3d at 619-20 (citing Giles v. California, 554 
U.S. 353, 358 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Kirby 
v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899)).  The court stressed that this 
exception is necessary to prevent injustice because the declarant is often the 
only witness to the homicide.  Hailes, 442 Md. at 512, 113 A.3d at 622 (citing 
Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897)). 
     In Hailes v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the length of 
time between a declarant’s statement and death is inconsequential in a dying 
declaration analysis.  The court further held that that the Confrontation Clause 
does not apply to dying declarations.  This holding establishes that a declarant 
can live indefinitely and their statement may still be admitted as a dying 
declaration.  The possibility of having both a dying declaration and a living 
declarant who is subject to cross-examination could cause evidentiary 
conflicts at trials when a defendant is charged with attempted murder or a 
related crime.  Moreover, practitioners should be aware of the subjectivity of 
dying declarations and note that circumstantial evidence is enough to establish 
a declarant’s belief of imminent death. 
 
